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This study examines how the association between terrorism and capital flight affects the 
process of industrialisationin 36 African countries.  The empirical evidence is based on 
Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Quantile Regressions (QR). GMM-oriented 
findings show that capital flight interacts with terrorism to negatively affect industrialisation 
in ‘domestic terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-oriented regressions. With QR approach, the 
GMM results are confirmed exclusively in the 25th and 50th quantiles, in regressions 
pertaining to domestic terrorism, unclear terrorism and total terrorism. It follows that the 
negative effect from the investigated interaction is driven by bottom quantiles of the 
industrialisation distribution. This confirms existing literature that developed countries are 
more likely to limit the negative externalities from terrorism compared to their developing 
counterparts. Hence, the negative consequence of the association between terrorism and 
capital flight on industrialisation is a decreasing function of industrialisation.  
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 The positioning of this inquiry on Africa is motivated by three main strands of 
contemporary relevance, notably: growing levels of capital flight, increasing terrorism and 
the lagging position of the continent in terms of industrialisation.  
 First, Africa has been plagued with growing levels of capital flight over the past 
decades (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017). In line with the narrative, thirty-three countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) lost approximately eight hundred and fourteen billion US Dollars 
(in constant of 2010 US Dollars) between 1970 and 2010.  On average terms, the amount 
that is lost to capital flight surpasses other main external inflows like development assistance 
and foreign direct investment which respectively during the same period, (i.e., 1970-2010) 
stood at six hundred and fifty-nine billion and three hundred and six billion US Dollars for 
the same countries. The corresponding absence of finance has been documented to inhibit 
economic prosperity in the continent (see Bartels et al., 2009; Tuomi, 2011; Boyce & 
Ndikumana, 2012; Darley, 2012). 
 Second, according to Clavarino (2014), terrorism is currently mushrooming in Africa 
because for the most part, Islamic fundamentalists on the continent are taking advantage of a 
plethora of favourable circumstances, inter alia: domestic armed forces that are undertrained 
and underequipped, vulnerable and corrupt central governments, booming trade in drugs that 
represents a source of financing and porous borders. Following the overthrow of Muammar 
Gaddafi’s regime in 2011, Islamic militancy has prospered in the Sahel region. Moreover, 
the French intervention in Mali has dispersed Islamic militants to neighbouring countries. In 
other parts of the continent, Islamic insurgency is also burgeoning. Notable terrorists’ 
organisations include: (i) the Boko Haram of Nigeria whose sphere of influence has 
extended to neighbouring countries like Cameroon, Niger and Chad; (ii) the Al-Shaab in 
East Africa which recently orchestrated a series of bombings in Kenya and  (iii)AQIM or 
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; the Algerian Mokhtar Belmokhtar leading Al-Qaeda-
linked Mulathameen Brigade; Tunisia-based Ansar Al-Shariya and Ansar Dine, which is led 
by Iyad Ag Ghaly who is Gaddafi’s former close ally(Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018). 
 Third, in relation to other continents in the world, Africa is lagging in terms of 
industrialisation. Its slow pace towards industrialization has been documented to be caused 
by inter alia: (i) poor investment climate and skills shortages (see Page, 2012; Gui-Diby & 
Renard, 2015); (ii) lack of investment capital essential to fund the process of 
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industrialisation (see Darley, 2012; Tuomi, 2011) and (iii) low added value to economic sub-
sectors (Asongu et al., 2020; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2021).  
 The purpose of this study is to assess how the policy syndromes discussed in the 
first-two strands affect the development outcome engaged in the third strand. In other words, 
the study aims to assess how terrorism interacts with capital flight to affect industrialisation. 
Whereas we intuitively expect the interaction to play negatively on industrialisation, it is 
relevant to substantiate this intuition with empirical validity to consolidate the perspective of 
policy makers. For this purpose, the modeling approach we adopt, engage both the 
conditional mean and the conditional distribution of industrialisation in order toprovide 
more room for more policy implications. The policy interest of assessing the interaction 
between terrorism and capital flight throughout the distribution of industrialisation is that 
blanket policies based on mean values of industrialisation may not be effective unless they 
are contingent on initial levels of industrialisation and tailored differently across countries 
with low, intermediate, and high levels of industrialisation.  Therefore, by accounting for 
initial levels of industrialisation, we can establish how existing levels of industrialisation 
affect the investigated relationship. The empirical technique also enables the study to assess 
conclusions in existing literature which maintain that more industrialised countries are more 
likely to limit the negative development externalities of terrorism compared to their less 
industrialised counterparts (Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2009).  Such a positioning steers clear of 
recent capital flight and terrorism literature on Africa.  
On the one hand, the attendant studies on capital flight have oriented towards a 
plethora of fronts. Mpenya et al. (2016) have focused on the relationship between resources 
and the flight of capital in the Republic of Cameroon while another group of authors have 
been concerned with the nexus between fiscal policy and the flight of capital (Mpenya et al., 
2016). Ndiaye and Siri (2016) focus on the relationship between capital flight and tax 
revenue in Burkina Faso, capital flight drivers within the remit of Ethiopia have been studied 
by Geda and Yimer (2016) while Ramiandrisoa and Rakotomanana (2016) have positioned 
another study on determinants of capital flight in Madagascar. Kwaramba et al. (2016) 
investigate the linkage between the flight of capital and misinvoicing of trade in Zimbabwe, 
Moulemvo, (2016) assess the nexus between the flight of capital and public social pending 
in the Congo Republic while Ndikumana (2016) examine case study lessons on the causes of 
capital flight as well as the corresponding consequences of the phenomenon. More recently, 
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Asongu and Nnanna (2020) have examined the relationship between governance and the 
capital flight trap.  
On the other hand, with regard to  African-oriented studies, Straus (2012) has been 
concerned with geopolitical variations, Barros et al. (2008) focus on poverty and the lack of 
freedoms within political and economic spheres, Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski (2013) look 
at how competing military companies engage to facilitate the end of conflict, Price and Elu 
(2016) assess the connection between global warming and terrorism, Ewi and Aning (2006) 
engage an exploratory study on the fundamental role of the African Union in fighting 
terrorism while Asongu et al. (2019) focus on how terrorism leads to the persistence of 
capital flight in the continent.  
The premise of this empirical study is also on the awareness of some risks involved 
when doing a study that is not founded on an established theoretical underpinning. Hence,  
the present study is an inductive research because it follows the attendant literature in 
arguing that applied econometrics is relevant in theory-building (Costantini & Lupi, 2005; 
Narayan et al., 2011).Such intuitions have been employed in recent capital flight (Asongu, 
2014a) and terrorism (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2018) literature.  
The rest of the study is structured as follows. The intuition for the linkages between 
terrorism, capital flight and industrialisation is provided in Section 2, the data and 
methodology are engaged in Section 3, while Section 4 presents the empirical results and 
discussion. Section 5 concludes with implications and future research directions.  
 
2. Intuition for the linkages between terrorism, capital flight and industrialisation 
This section is discussed in three main strands, notably: (i) clarification of the 
concepts of terrorism, capital flight and industrialisation as used in the study; (ii) a 
discussion on the relationship between terrorism and capital flight and (iii) insights into the 
nexuses between instability from terrorism, capital flight and industrialisation. These 
underlying strands are substantiated following the same order as highlighted.  
In the first strand on conceptual clarifications, borrowing from recent literature 
(Naude et al., 2013: Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019; Efobi et al., 2019), while capital flight is 
defined as unrecorded cash flows from transactions between a specific country and the rest 
of the world, industrialisation can be understood as a process of socio-economic 
transformation that is characterised by a rapid evolving manufacturing sector with regard to 
a multitude of possibilities of production or work that is performed in a country. The 
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attendant definition is founded on insights from the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) because it engenders manufacturing sector added value in a 
scenario in which the entire economic size is considered. As recently maintained by Gui-
Diby and Renard (2015), in a scenario where the development state of the manufacturing 
sector is relatively high in relation to  other economic sub-sectors, there is likely to be a fast 
industrialisation rate in the country. Moreover, as recently documented by Asongu and 
Odhiambo (2019), two aspects are relevant in comprehending and boosting the process of 
industrialisation, namely: (i) the capacity of governments to provide productive incentives to 
the manufacturing sector and (ii) the likelihood of the production sector to be sustainable in 
view of meeting requirements at local and international spheres.  
 Terrorism according to recent terrorism literature (Efobi & Asongu, 2016) denotes 
the employment of violence by groups and/or individuals to fight non-combatants in view of 
boosting socio-political goals as well as intimidating a larger targeted audience that is 
outside the remit of those victims that are immediately affected (Bandyopadhyay et al, 
2014). 
 Regarding the second strand on the linkage between terrorism and capital flight, 
according to Efobi and Asongu (2016), contrary to a scenario involving political instability, 
terrorism entails targeting of civilians to constrain a government to concede to some socio-
political demands. Given that the prevalence of terrorist actions is not deterministic and 
hence, difficult to predict, risks and costs of retaining capital in the domestic economy are 
involved. In a plethora of instances, fundamental and/or strategic economic locations are 
targeted by terrorists and in scenarios that the governments cannot implement stringent and 
robust anti-terrorism policies; their domestic economies would experience high capital 
outflows in the light of the high rate of capital insecurity and/or uncertainty. Accordingly, 
terrorism can impact movements of capital in the light of attendant literature on the nexuses 
between, instability, terrorism and negative investment flows (Collier et al, 2001; 
Ndikumana & Boyce, 2011; Henry, 2012;  Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2014; Ndikumana et 
al., 2015; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014, 2015; Asongu & Nnanna, 2020). 
 In the third strand pertaining to linkages between instability, capital flight and 
industrialisation, the instability of the politico-economic environment influences loss and/or 
damages of assets owing to capital flight (Collier et al., 2004; Davies, 2008; Ndikumana et 
al., 2015; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2017; Asongu & Odhiambo, 2019). In essence, an 
environment that is characterised by terrorism is likely to be linked to higher investment 
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risks and by extension, more capital flight. Accordingly, investments are likely to be 
transferred from the country affected by terrorism to other nations that are not or less 
affected by terrorism. Hence, such transfers of capital needed for investment purposes 
unfavourably affect industrialisation in the countries affected by terrorism and ceteris 
paribus, favourably influence industrialisation in the countries to which such capital flows 
are transferred for similar and/or alternative investment purposes (Lensink et al., 2000; Le & 
Zak, 2006; Efobi et al., 2015).  
  
3. Data and methodology  
3.1 Data  
 The inquiry assesses a panel of 36 countries in Africa using data from 1996 to 20101. 
The three principal sources of data are: (i) Boyce and Ndikumana (2012) for the capital flight 
measurement; (ii) terrorism incidents from Enders et al. (2011) and Gailbulloev et al. (2012) 
and (iii) other macroeconomic variables from African Development Indicators of the World 
Bank. Restrictions to selected countries and sampled periodicity are constrained by issues of 
data availability.   
 In accordance with recent literature, industrialisation which is the dependent variable 
measures the added value in manufacturing in constant prices as a percentage of GDP (see 
Efobi et al., 2019). This measurement of industrialisation is consistent with the International 
Standard Industrial Classification (Section D). The variable proxy’s for units of 
manufacturing that are categorized in relation to the principal mission that entails activities 
which are done manually (encompassing work in the household), factor-related and power-
oriented machinery (United Nations, 1990). Moreover, such an industrialisation indicator has 
been adopted in recent literature, notably, Kang and Lee (2011), UNIDO(2013), Gui-Diby 
and Renard, (2015) and Shobande and Shodipe (2019). 
 Following recent literature (Naude et al., 2013; Efobi et al., 2019), the process of 
industrialisation entails a socio-economic framework of fast transformation in the 
manufacturing sector with respect to a multitude of production opportunities and activities 
operating in an economy. With the whole economic size taken into consideration, 
                                                             
1The thirty-six countries are: Algeria, Angola, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, 
Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritania, Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria, 
Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Tunisia, Uganda, 




industrialisation embodies that added value of the manufacturing sector. As argued by Gui-
Diby and Renard (2015), the industrialisation rate of a country is a positive function of the 
comparatively higher rate of development in the manufacturing sector, relative to other 
economic sectors. In the light of these clarifications, two insights are worth emphasising for 
the enhancement of the process of industrialisation, notably: (i) the availability of production 
incentives in the manufacturing sector and (ii) the sustainability of the corresponding sector 
of production as far as international and local needs are concerned.  
 Capital flight is measured as unrecorded capital flows between a nation and the rest 
of the world (see Weeks, 2015; Efobi & Asongu, 2016). The process of measuring these 
flows begin from inflows related to foreign exchanges that are considered in the Balance of 
Payments of a country and the amount of missing currency is appreciated in terms of ‘net 
errors and omissions.  The corresponding missing currency is also acknowledged as the 
difference between recorded inflows and recorded outflows.  
 The principal shortcoming of this indicator  is it cannot be directly compared with 
other indicators adopted in the study, since the capital flight indicator is defined in terms of 
constant 2010 US Dollars. We borrow from Asongu (2014a) in tackling the issue in three 
steps. (i) The GDP is first transformed into constant 2010 terms. (ii) The corresponding 
value is divided by 1 000 000 to obtain ‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)’. (iii) 
Capital flight is lastly divided by the ‘GDP constant of 2010 USD (in millions)’.After the 
computations, a capital flight indicator that is comparable with other indicators is obtained 
(see Appendix 2). 
 Four terrorism indicators are adopted, namely: domestic terrorism, transnational 
terrorism, unclear terrorism, and total terrorism. Consistent with Ender and Sandler (2006), 
terrorism is defined as the actual and threatened use of force by sub-national actors to secure 
political objectives by means of intimidation. It is measured as the number of yearly 
incidents of terrorism registered in a country. To avoid mathematical issues that are linked to 
the (i) log-transformation of zeros and (ii) correction of the positive skew in the data, we are 
in accordance with recent literature (Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a; Choi & Salehyan, 
2013; Asongu & Kodila-Tedika, 2017) in taking the natural logarithm of terrorism incidents 
by adding one to the base.  
Terrorism-specific definitions are from Efobi et al. (2015, p. 6). Domestic terrorism 
“includes all incidences of terrorist activities that involve the nationals of the venue country: 
implying that the perpetrators, the victims, the targets and supporters are all from the venue 
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country” (p.6). Transnational terrorism is “terrorism including those acts of terrorism that 
concern at least two countries. This implies that the perpetrator, supporters and incidence 
may be from/in one country, but the victim and target is from another”. Unclear terrorism is 
that “which constitutes incidences of terrorism that can neither be defined as domestic nor 
transnational terrorism” (p.6). Total terrorism is the sum of domestic, transnational, and 
unclear terrorisms.  
To account for bias in omitted variables, five control variables are adopted, namely: 
domestic credit to the private sector, financial allocation efficiency, population growth, 
domestic investment or gross fixed capital formation and trade openness. Whereas from an 
intuitive perspective, positive nexuses should be expected between the adopted control 
variables and industrialisation, the effects are contingent on market dynamism on the one 
hand and effective allocation of resources on the other hand. For example the substantially 
documented issues of surplus liquidity in African financial institutions (see  Saxegaard, 2006; 
Asongu, 2014b) is an indication that the financial allocation efficiency indicator may 
negatively affect industrialisation. This is essentially because not much mobilised resources 
that promote industrialisation are transformed into credit for investment purposes.  
Furthermore, if a huge proportion of public investment (contained in domestic 
investment)is siphoned by corrupt officials, the expected incidence on industrialisation may 
not be appealing or positive. Moreover, if a great share of the portion of public investment 
that actually gets invested into an economy is invested in some socio-economic sectors (e.g. 
education and health) that are not directly connected to the process of industrialisation; a 
positive outcome on industrialisation may not also be expected. It is also relevant to bear in 
mind that, population growth may not positively affect the industrialisation process if the 
underlying population growth is associated with export-substitution, owing to incremental 
demands for foreign commodities from the corresponding population. Appendix 1 provides 
the definitions of the variables whereas Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 respectively disclose the 
summary statistics and correlation matrix.   
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 GMM Specification 
There are five main factors that motivate the use of a Generalised Method of Moments 
(GMM) as estimation approach (Tchamyou, 2019, 2020; Vu & Asongu, 2020). The first-two 
are basic conditions for the employment of the technique whereas the last-three are 
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advantages related to the empirical approach. First, the N>T condition is met because the 
number of cross-sections (36) is higher than the number of time series (15) in each cross 
section.  Second, industrialisation is established to be persistent because the correlation 
between industrialisation and its first lag is 0.961, which is higher than the rule of thumb 
threshold of 0.800 needed to ascertain persistence in an outcome variable (Tchamyou et al., 
2019a). Third, endogeneity is considered in the estimation approach because: (i) the 
instrumentation process accounts for simultaneity in the regressors and (ii) there is also 
control for the unobserved by means of time invariant omitted variables. Fourth, apparent 
small sample biases that are associated with the difference GMM approach are corrected with 
the system GMM strategy. Fifth, owing to the panel-related empirical approach, cross-
country variations are factored-in.  The present study adopts the Roodman (2009a, 2009b) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) which is premised on employing forward orthogonal 
variations as opposed to differences. This alternative approach has the advantage of limiting 
over-identification and restricting the proliferation of instruments (Tchamyou & Asongu, 
2017; Asongu & Biekpe, 2018). Given that the one-step approach is based on 
homoscedasticity, this study adopts the two-step method instead because it is robust or 
controls for heteroscedasticity (Tchamyou et al., 2019b).  
 Equation (1) and Equation (2) below summarize the standard GMM estimation 
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where, tiInd , is industrialisation of country i at  period t ; tiInd , is industrialisation of country 
i  in  period t ; tiCap , is capital flight of country i at  period t ; tiTer , is terrorism 
(domestic, transnational, unclear and total terrorism) of country i in  period t ; 0 is a 
constant; represents the coefficient of auto-regression; W  is the vector of control variables 
(domestic investment, trade openness, population, domestic credit and bank efficiency), i is 




3.2.2 Identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions 
 
Clarifying identification, simultaneity and exclusion restrictions is worthwhile for a good 
GMM specification.  First, within the framework of identification, all explanatory variables 
are considered as suspected endogenous or predetermined variables and only time invariant 
indicators are acknowledged to reflect strict exogeneity. Dewan and Ramaprasad (2014) and 
Asongu and Nwachukwu (2016b) have adopted a similar identification approach. Moreover, 
the identification strategy is founded on the idea that it is not very likely for time-invariant 
variables of exhibit endogeneity after first difference (see Roodman, 2009b)2.  
 Second, with regard to simultaneity, lagged regressors are employed as instruments 
for forward differenced variables. Therefore, Helmet transformations are employed for the 
regressors in order to remove fixed effects that are likely to affect the assessed nexuses 
(Asongu, 2020). The engaged transformation entails the use of forward mean-differencing of 
the indicators, which is contrary to the use of a process in which past observations are 
subtracted from future observations (see Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). These transformations 
permit orthogonal or parallel conditions between forward differenced variables and lagged 
values. Irrespective of the number of lags, data loss is avoided by computing the underlying 
transformations for all observations with the exception of the last observation in cross 
sections: “And because lagged observations do not enter the formula, they are valid as 
instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 104). 
 Third, on the dimension of exclusion restrictions, the chosen time invariant indicators 
are acknowledged to be strictly exogenous by affecting the dependent variable exclusively 
via the suspected or predetermined variables. Moreover, the econometrics relevance of the 
underlying exclusion restriction is assessed with the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for the 
validity of the time invariant omitted variables. In essence, in order for the time invariant 
variables to explain the outcome variable exclusively through the suspected endogenous 
variables, the null hypothesis of the test should not be rejected3. With the current GMM 
setting, the information criterion used to investigate whether variables that are time-invariant 
reflect strict exogeneity is the DHT. Hence, in the light of the above clarification, in reporting 
                                                             
2Hence, the approach for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while the gmmstyle is used  for suspected 
endogenous  variables. 
3It is important to take note of the fact that in a standard Instrumental Variable (IV) approach, failure to reject 
the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying Restrictions (OIR) test implies that the instruments do not 




findings in the next section, the assumption on exclusion restriction is valid when the null 
hypothesis linked to the DHT related with IV(year, eq(diff)) is not rejected. 
 
 
3.2.3 Extended analysis with Quantile regressions 
 
The GMM estimation approach above is based on mean values of the outcome 
variable. Unfortunately, as motivated in the introduction, the investigated relationship based 
on mean values of the dependent variable results in blanked policies, which may not be 
effective unless they are contingent on initial levels of the dependent variable. In order to 
address this shortcoming, the empirical investigation is extended with Quantile regressions 
(QR). The QR enables the assessement of estimated linkages throughout  the conditional 
distribution of industrialisation (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009). 
It is important to note that, while mean effects are important, some approaches like  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) assumethat the outcome variable and error terms are normally 
distibuted. The QR is not based on such a hypothesis of normally distributed error terms. 
Hence, the estimation approache enables this study to examine the incidences of terrorism 
and capital flight with specific emphasis on nations with low, intermediate and high levels of 
industrialisation. In essence, with the QR strategy, estimated parameters are derived at 
various points of the conditional distribution of industrialisation (Keonker & Hallock, 2001). 
QR is growingly being used in the economic development literature (Billger & Goel, 2009; 
Okada & Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013).  
The  th quantile estimator focusing on industrialisation is resolved by engaging an 
optimization problem that is disclosed in the absence of subscripts in Equation (3) in order to 
enhance presentation and simplicity.   





























,                                       (3)
 
where  1,0 .Contrary to OLS which is fundamentally premised on reducing the sum of 
squared residuals, the QR technique consists of minimising the weighted sum of absolute 
deviations. As cases in point, the 10th or 90th quantiles (with, respectively, =0.10 or 0.90) are 
obtained by approximately weighing the residuals. Hence, the conditional quantile of 
industrialisation or iy given ix is: 
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 iiy xxQ )/( ,           (4) 
where specific parameters of slope are estimated for each  th specific quantile. This 
formulation is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the corresponding OLS slope in which 
parameters are assessed exclusively at the average of the conditional distribution of 
industrialisation. Looking at Equation (4) for instance, the outcome variable iy  is the variable 
of industrialisation while ix contains a constant term, domestic investment, trade openness, 
population, domestic credit and bank efficiency.  
 
4. Presentation of results  
 
Table 1 and Table 2 respectively present the findings corresponding to the GMM and QR 
approaches. Four main criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model based 
forward orthogonal deviations4. Based on the criterion, all the estimated models are valid. 
From the findings, the intuition that capital flight interacts with terrorism to negatively affect 
industrialisation is confirmed in ‘domestic terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-oriented 
regressions. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs.  
 Four main specification sets are provided in Table 2. The first consists of 
transnational and domestic modelling disclosed in Panel A while the second represents 
estimations focusing on total and unclear terrorism dynamics in Panel B. In other words, the 
left-hand side of Panel A shows findings related to domestic terrorism while the left-hand 
side of Panel B reveals corresponding results focusing unclear terrorism. In the same vein, 
the right-hand side of Panel A shows findings for transnational terrorism while the 
corresponding Panel B reveals findings for total terrorism. For both tables, it is consistently 
apparent that signs of the QR estimates vary with respect of significance and signs. The 
consistent variations in signs further validate the relevance of choosing the QR strategy.   
In Table 2, the negative effect on industrialisation from the interaction between 
capital flight and terrorism established in the GMM results is confirmed from ‘domestic 
terrorism’-, ‘unclear terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-oriented regressions, exclusively in the 
25th and 50th quantiles. It follows from the findings that the negative effect from the 
                                                             
4“First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for the absence of 
autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not 
be significant because their null hypotheses are the positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, 
while the Sargan OIR test is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments . In order to 
restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower than the number of cross-sections 
in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for exogeneity of instruments is also employed to assess the validity of 
results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a Fisher test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 
2017, p.200).  
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underlying interaction established in the GMM results is driven by the bottom quantile of the 
industrialisation distribution. Most of the significant control variables have the expected 
signs. 
 
Table 1: GMM regressions  
         
 Dependent variable: Industrialisation 
         
 Domestic Terrorism Transnational Terrorism Unclear Terrorism Total Terrorism 
         
Industrialisation(-1) 0.784*** 0.773*** 0.748*** 0.758*** 0.740*** 0.709*** 0.748*** 0.766*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 1.592 3.063* 4.823* 5.218*** 3.453 2.290 3.372 5.129** 
 (0.517) (0.063) (0.093) (0.002) (0.272) (0.153) (0.299) (0.012) 
Domestic Terrorism (Domter) 0.243*** 0.358*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.008) (0.000)       
Transnational Terrorism (Transter) --- --- -0.102 0.105 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.551) (0.220)     
Unclear Terrorism (Unter) --- --- --- --- -0.191* -0.364** --- --- 
     (0.052) (0.041)   
Total Terrorism (Totter) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.198* 0.379*** 
       (0.080) (0.000) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) -0.023 -0.181 -0.252 -0.332** -0.136 0.057 -0.167 -0.390** 
 (0.920) (0.187) (0.323) (0.041) (0.601) (0.754) (0.541) (0.039) 
Domter ×CapFlight -0.017** -0.018*** --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.027) (0.000)       
Transter×CapFlight --- --- -0.010 -0.001 --- --- --- --- 
   (0.357) (0.869)     
Unter×CapFlight --- --- --- --- 0.018 -0.002 --- --- 
     (0.189) (0.881)   
Totter×CapFlight --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.015 -0.017*** 
       (0.106) (0.005) 
Trade  0.027* 0.032*** 0.019 0.028*** 0.028** 0.026*** 0.027* 0.032*** 
 (0.086) (0.001) (0.236) (0.001) (0.015) (0.004) (0.098) (0.002) 
Domestic Investment  -0.041** -0.029*** -0.032* -0.024** -0.046** -0.017** -0.035*** -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.004) (0.068) (0.020) (0.011) (0.045) (0.009) (0.111) 
Population   --- -0.007 --- -0.009 --- -0.015** --- -0.006 
  (0.134)  (0.171)  (0.026)  (0.221) 
Bank Efficiency --- -0.014*** --- -0.019*** --- -0.022*** --- -0.017*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Private credit  --- 0.037*** --- 0.043*** --- 0.041*** --- 0.034*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
         
AR(1) (0.239) (0.037) (0.242) (0.033) (0.233) (0.025) (0.246) (0.030) 
AR(2) (0.351) (0.269) (0.365) (0.320) (0.357) (0.193) (0.359) (0.412) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
Hansen OIR (0.636) (0.961) (0.857) (0.781) (0.779) (0.938) (0.830) (0.921) 
         
DHT for instruments         
(a)Instruments in levels         
H excluding group (0.304) (0.674) (0.390) (0.878) (0.812) (0.949) (0.325) (0.662) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.759) (0.960) (0.933) (0.555) (0.602) (0.775) (0.938) (0.907) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))         
H excluding group (0.663) (0.537) (0.721) (0.589) (0.830) (0.428) (0.815) (0.501) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.439) (1.000) (0.792) (0.890) (0.463) (1.000) (0.589) (1.000) 
         
Fisher  64.77*** 1039.23*** 93.67*** 328.08*** 51.89*** 688.42*** 48.86*** 548.40*** 
Instruments  29 41 29 41 29 41 29 41 
Countries  35 35 35 35 35 35 35 35 
Observations  405 385 405 385 405 385 405 385 
         
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. 
Dif: Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated 
coefficients and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) & AR(2) tests and; b) 









Table  2: Quantile regressions  
             
 Dependent Variable: Industrialisation  
             
 Panel A: Domestic Terrorism and Transnational Terrorism    
 Domestic Terrorism (Domter) Transnational Terrorism (Tranter) 
             
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant 0.036 0.240 -1.072 1.847 -6.227 -1.398 -0.518 1.346 1.063 -1.348 -7.772 -3.043 
 (0.993) (0.952) (0.741) (0.478) (0.144) (0.746) (0.903) (0.734) (0.787) (0.564) (0.146) (0.700) 
Domestic Terrorism (Domter) 0.082 0.108 0.510* -0.120 0.327 -0.257 -- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.846) (0.738) (0.092) (0.638) (0.496) (0.617)       
Transnational Terrorism 
(Tranter) 
--- --- --- --- --- --- -1.00* -0.098 -0.507 -
1.163*** 
-0.950 -0.620 
       (0.061) (0.843) (0.365) (0.001) (0.256) (0.545) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) 1.306*** 0.904** 1.715*** 1.548*** 2.302*** 1.658*** 1.338*** 0.835** 1.372*** 1.732*** 2.422*** 1.909** 
 (0.002) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) 
Domter × CapFlight -0.050 -0.027 -
0.112*** 
-0.060** -0.046 0.092* --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.225) (0.414) (0.000) (0.017) (0.304) (0.097)       
Transter× CapFlight --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.030 -0.042 -0.084 -0.013 0.077 0.123 
       (0.586) (0.471) (0.120) (0.683) (0.313) (0.157) 
Trade  0.058*** -
0.028*** 
-0.011* 0.017*** 0.051*** 0.179*** 0.059*** -
0.035*** 
-0.008 0.013*** 0.058*** 0.180*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.091) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.292) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 






















 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 






















 (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Efficiency 0.028** 0.023** -0.001 -0.010 0.005 0.077*** 0.031** 0.019* 0.0003 -0.0008 0.011 0.046** 
 (0.028) (0.038) (0.861) (0.171) (0.681) (0.000) (0.016) (0.067) (0.972) (0.896) (0.458) (0.018) 
Private credit  0.117*** 0.082*** 0.176*** 0.167*** 0.154*** 0.095*** 0.111*** 0.083*** 0.181*** 0.152*** 0.147*** 0.108*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.284 0.141 0.207 0.242 0.202 0.238 0.287 0.140 0.202 0.241 0.202 0.233 
Fisher  27.51***      26.33***      
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
             
 Panel B: Unclear Terrorism and Total Terrorism  
 Unclear Terrorism (Unter) Total Terrorism (Totter) 
   
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
             
Constant -0.343 -0.579 -1.432 0.210 -6.973 -6.488 -0.121 0.568 0.074 1.400 -6.921 -2.589 
 (0.933) (0.890) (0.635) (0.941) (0.122) (0.297) (0.977) (0.883) (0.984) (0.596) (0.118) (0.621) 
Unclear Terrorism (Unter) -1.517 0.064 -0.680 -1.029 -0.998 -1.769 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.109) (0.940) (0.309) (0.115) (0.285) (0.291)       
Total Terrorism (Totter) --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.140 0.258 0.403 -0.143 0.316 -0.521 
       (0.758) (0.424) (0.295) (0.606) (0.566) (0.386) 
Capital Flight (-1)(CapFlight) 1.343*** 0.958** 1.772*** 1.700*** 2.358*** 2.061*** 1.335*** 0.905** 1.576*** 1.709*** 2.347*** 1.683*** 
 (0.001) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 




-0.054 0.032 --- --- --- --- --- --- 
 (0.523) (0.371) (0.002) (0.005) (0.470) (0.795)       
Totter× CapFlight --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.041 -0.036 -
0.112*** 
-0.063** -0.052 0.108* 
       (0.356) (0.298) (0.003) (0.018) (0.313) (0.084) 




0.019*** 0.062*** 0.172*** 0.057*** -
0.032*** 
-0.017** 0.015** 0.058*** 0.180*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) 






















 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 






















 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Efficiency 0.027** 0.025** -0.002 -0.008 0.003 0.082*** 0.027** 0.023** -0.001 -0.017** 0.007 0.069*** 
 (0.028) (0.022) (0.792) (0.282) (0.802) (0.000) (0.028) (0.039) (0.924) (0.020) (0.560) (0.000) 
Private credit  0.116*** 0.108*** 0.183*** 0.166*** 0.151*** 0.086** 0.114*** 0.082*** 0.178*** 0.173*** 0.146*** 0.106*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
             
Pseudo R²/R² 0.289 0.141 0.212 0.248 0.208 0.232 0.285 0.142 0.211 0.244 0.202 0.236 
Fisher  26.92***      28.09***      
Observations  386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
             
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² for OLS and Pseudo R² for quantile 
regression. Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations where industrialisationis  least. 
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5. Concluding implications and future research directions  
 
This study has examined how the association between terrorism and capital flight affects the 
process of industrialisation in 36 African countries for the period 1996-2010.  The empirical 
evidence is based on Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Quantile Regressions 
(QR). GMM-oriented findings revealed capital flight interacts with terrorism to negatively 
affect industrialisation in ‘domestic terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-oriented regressions. 
When the association is examined throughout the conditional distribution of industrialisation 
using the QR approach, the GMM results are confirmed from ‘domestic terrorism’-, ‘unclear 
terrorism’- and ‘total terrorism’-oriented regressions, exclusively in the 25th and 50thquantiles. 
It follows that the negative effect from the investigated interaction is driven by bottom 
quantiles of the industrialisation distribution. 
 In the light of above findings, countries with below-median levels of industrialisation 
are more likely to experience negative consequences of the interaction between capital flight 
and terrorism compared to their counterparts with above-median levels of industrialisation. 
This leads us to conclude that the negative consequences of terrorism and capital flight on 
industrialisation is a decreasing function of industrialisation. This broadly confirms findings 
of Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) that the negative impact of terrorism on macroeconomic 
indicators is more pronounced in less developed countries, relative to their more developed 
counterparts. This is essentially because less developed countries do not have the logistical, 
technological and financial resources with which to hedge the attendant economic shock 
without substantial unfavourable externalities. These findings justify the need for more 
industrialised countries to help less industrialised nations with development assistance in the 
fight against terrorism, capital flight and their corresponding negative development 
externalities. This study can be extended by assessing if the established findings withstand 















Appendix 1: Definitions of Variables  
Variables  Signs Definitions of variables  (Measurement) Sources 
    
Industrialisation Industria Manufacturing (ISICD) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Capital flight Capf. Ln of Capital Flight (constant of 2010) Ndikumana& 
Boyce (2012a) 
    
Domestic 
Terrorism 
Domter Number of Domestic terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Transnational 
Terrorism 
Tranter Number of Transnational terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Unclear 
Terrorism 
Unter Number of  Unclear  terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Total Terrorism Totter Number of Total terrorism incidents (in Ln) Enders et al. 
(2011). 
    
Bank Efficiency BcBd Bank credit to bank deposits (%) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic Credit Domcred Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Trade  Trade Exports and Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) World Bank (WDI) 
    
Domestic 
Investment  
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation (including Acquisitions less 
disposals of valuables) (% of GDP) 
World Bank (WDI) 
    
Population  Pop Population (in millions) World Bank (WDI) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.PCA: Principal Component Analysis.  
 
Appendix 2: Summary statistics (1996-2010) 
      
 Mean SD Minimum Maximum Observations 
      
Industrialisation  11.355 6.699 2.207 36.858 528 
Capital flight  9.934 0.784 6.816 12.333 417 
Domestic Terrorism  0.441 0.863 0.000 4.488 540 
Transnational Terrorism 0.243 0.539 0.000 3.332 540 
Unclear Terrorism  0.106 0.399 0.000 4.488 540 
Total Terrorism  0.594 0.989 0.000 4.844 540 
Bank Efficiency  67.069 28.572 13.753 164.618 517 
Domestic Credit 16.596 15.036 0.198 103.632 511 
Trade Openness  69.974 39.783 0.000 225.043 540 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation  21.031 9.398 2.000 63.698 528 
Population  20.97 26.681 0.077 159.424 540 
      
S.D: Standard Deviation.   
 
Appendix 3: Correlation matrix (uniform sample size: 369) 
            
Control variables Terrorism variables    
Pop GFCF Trade  Domcred BcBd Domter Tranter Unter Totter Capfl. Industria  
1.000 -0.096 -0.320 -0.441 -0.107 0.104 0.170 0.022 0.114 0.121 -0.245 Pop 
 1.000 0.287 0.169 -0.169 -0.139 -0.210 -0.116 -0.186 -0.016 -0.105 GFCF 
  1.000 0.004 -0.107 -0.169 -0.111 -0.091 -0.174 -0.102 0.236 Trade 
   1.000 0.393 -0.114 -0.095 -0.063 -0.123 0.042 0.242 Domcred 
    1.000 -0.154 -0.023 -0.120 -0.144 -0.145 0.242 BcBd 
     1.000 0.525 0.340 0.913 0.181 -0.155 Domter 
      1.000 0.491 0.756 0.251 -0.189 Tranter 
       1.000 0.561 0.183 -0.146 Unter 
        1.000 0.249 -0.189 Totter 
         1.000 -0.057 Capfl. 
          1.000 Industria 
            
Pop: Population. GFCF: Gross Fixed Capital Formation. Domcred: Domestic credit to the private sector. BcBd: Bank Credit to Bank 
Deposits.Domter: Domestic Terrorism. Tranter:  Transnational Terrorism. Unter: Unclear Terrorism. Totter: Total Terrorism. Capfl: 
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